(nods) Yes, that's consistent with what I've heard others say.

Like you, I don't understand the question and have no idea of what an answer to it might look like, which is why I say I'm not entirely clear what question you/they claim is being answered. Perhaps it would be more correct to say I'm not clear how it differs from the question you/they want answered.

Mostly I suspect that the belief that there is a second question to be answered that hasn't been is a strong, pervasive, sincere, compelling confusion, akin to where does the bread go?. But I can't prove it.

Relatedly: I remember, many years ago, attending a seminar where a philosophy student protested to Dennett that he didn't feel like the sort of process Dennett described. Dennett replied "How can you tell? Maybe this is exactly what the sort of process I'm describing feels like!"

I recognize that the traditional reply to this is "No! The sort of process Dennett describes doesn't feel like anything at all! It has no qualia, it has no subjective experience!"

To which my response is mostly "Why should I believe that?" An acceptable alternative seems to be that subjective experience ("qualia", if you like) is simply a property of certain kinds of computation, just as the ability to predict the future location of a falling object ("prescience", if you like) is a property of certain kinds of computation.

To which one is of course free to reply "but how could prescience -- er, I mean qualia -- possibly be an aspect of computation??? It just doesn't make any sense!!!" And I shrug.

Sure, if I say in English "prescience is an aspect of computation," that sounds like a really weird thing to say, because "prescience" and "computation" are highly charged words with opposite framings. But if I throw out the English words and think about computing the state of the world at some future time, it doesn't seem mysterious at all, and such computations have become so standard a part of our lives we no longer give it much thought.

When computations that report their subjective experience become ubiquitous, we will take the computational nature of qualia for granted in much the same way.