My first instinctive response is "be wary of theories of personal identity where your future depends on a coin flip". You're essentially saying "one of the clones believes that it is your current 'I' experiencing 'X', and it has a 50% chance of being wrong". That seems off.
I think to be consistent, you have to anticipate experiencing both X and ~X with 100% probability. The problem is that the way anticipation works with probability depends implicitly on there only being one future self that things can happen to.
You're essentially saying "one of the clones believes that it is your current 'I' experiencing 'X', and it has a 50% chance of being wrong".
No, I'm not saying that.
I'm saying: first both clones believe "anticipate X with 50% probability". Then one clone experiences X, and the other ~X. After that they know what they experienced, so of course one updates to believe "I experienced X with ~1 probability" and the other "I experienced ~X with ~1 probability".
...I think to be consistent, you have to anticipate experienci
Another month has passed and here is a new rationality quotes thread. The usual rules are: