I'm puzzled that you believe this about hallucinations - that it's possible for the brain to devote enough processing power to create a "strong" hallucination in the Dennettian sense - but upthread, you seemed to be saying that dreams did not require such processing power.
It is perfectly consistent to both believe that (some people) can have fully realistic mental imagery, and that (most people's) dreams tend to exhibit sub-realistic mental imagery.
I have one friend who claims to have eidetic mental imagery, and I have no reason to doubt her. Thomas Metzinger discusses in Being No-One the notion of whether the brain can generate fully realistic imagery, and holds that it usually cannot, but notes the existence of eidetic imaginers as an exception to the rule.
Thanks for the cite: sadly, on clicking through, I get a menacing error message in a terrifying language, so evidently you can't share it that way? You are quite right that it's consistent. It's just that it surprised my model, which was saying "if realistic mental imagery is going to happen anywhere, surely it's going to be dreams, that seems obviously the time-of-least-contention-for-visual-workspace."
I'm beginning to wonder whether any useful phenomenology at all survives the Typical Mind Fallacy. Right now, if somebody turned up claiming that...
Another month has passed and here is a new rationality quotes thread. The usual rules are: