Imagine children pondering their future development. They envision growing up, but they also see themselves start caring more about work and less about play. Children consider those extrapolated values to be unwanted, so they formulate the scenario as "problem of growing up" and they try to come up with a safe solution. Of course, you may substitute "play versus work" with any "children versus adults" trope of your chice. Or "adolescents versus adults", and so on.
The implication is "more work less play" is a better value set, while "the minimum amount of work to get the optimal amount of play with minimal harm" seems superior to both childish naivity and hard-core work ethic. Biology and social expectations get involved, here, more so than increased intelligence. While a superintelligence would have these to worry about after a fashion (an AGI would need to worry about its programmers/other AGIs/upgrades or damaged hardware, for example), it seems bit orthogonal to CEV.
(I kinda get the impression that most child vs adult values are "adults worry about this so that they don't have to if they do it right". Children who don't want to worry about checkbooks, employment and chatting about the weather grow up to be adults who concern themselves with those things only because they have to if they want to maintain or exceed the quality of life they had as children. Judging by the fate of most lottery winners, this isn't all that more intelligent than where they started; the rational thing to do if one values fun more than work and just received >$10,000,000 would not be to buy all the toys and experiences one desires right away, yet most winners do just that and wind up spending more than they win.)
My main objection to Coherent Extrapolated Volition (CEV) is the "Extrapolated" part. I don't see any reason to trust the extrapolated volition of humanity - but this isn't just for self centred reasons. I don't see any reason to trust my own extrapolated volition. I think it's perfectly possible that my extrapolated volition would follow some scenario like this:
There are many other ways this could go, maybe ending up as a negative utilitarian or completely indifferent, but that's enough to give the flavour. You might trust the person you want to be, to do the right things. But you can't trust them to want to be the right person - especially several levels in (compare with the argument in this post, and my very old chaining god idea). I'm not claiming that such a value drift is inevitable, just that it's possible - and so I'd want my initial values to dominate when there is a large conflict.
Nor do I give Armstrong 7's values any credit for having originated from mine. Under torture, I'm pretty sure I could be made to accept any system of values whatsoever; there are other ways that would provably alter my values, so I don't see any reason to privilege Armstrong 7's values in this way.
"But," says the objecting strawman, "this is completely different! Armstrong 7's values are the ones that you would reach by following the path you would want to follow anyway! That's where you would get to, if you started out wanting to be more altruistic, had control over you own motivational structure, and grew and learnt and knew more!"
"Thanks for pointing that out," I respond, "now that I know where that ends up, I must make sure to change the path I would want to follow! I'm not sure whether I shouldn't be more altruistic, or avoid touching my motivational structure, or not want to grow or learn or know more. Those all sound pretty good, but if they end up at Armstrong 7, something's going to have to give."