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OccamsTaser comments on Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma - Less Wrong
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I propose a variation of fairbot, let's call it two-tiered fairbot (TTF).
If the opponent cooperates* iff I cooperate, cooperate
else, if the opponent cooperates* iff (I cooperate iff the opponent cooperates), check to see if the opponent cooperates
and cooperate iff he/she does*
else, defect.
It seems to cooperate against any "reasonable" agents, as well as itself (unless there's something I'm missing) while defecting against cooperatebot. Any thoughts?
*As determined by proof check.
It cooperates with CooperateBot, for the same Löbian reason that FairBot does. The substatement "if I defected, then CooperateBot will defect" is actually true because you cooperate (and "if false, then false" is a tautology).