wedrifid comments on Prisoner's Dilemma (with visible source code) Tournament - Less Wrong

47 Post author: AlexMennen 07 June 2013 08:30AM

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Comment author: AlexMennen 05 June 2013 09:52:07PM 6 points [-]

The payoffs for "other" were designed so that neither failing to halt, nor convincing the other player not to halt, should ever be a worthwhile strategy. If you don't halt, it gives you the same payoff as if you had cooperated, and gives the other player the same payoff as if you had defected. That way, not halting should be strictly dominated by defecting, since you are better off if you defect, and the other player should react the same way to each threat. And tricking the other player into not halting is also a bad idea, since the payoff you get from it is the same as if they defected.

Comment author: wedrifid 11 June 2013 08:27:31AM 2 points [-]

The payoffs for "other" were designed so that neither failing to halt, nor convincing the other player not to halt, should ever be a worthwhile strategy. If you don't halt, it gives you the same payoff as if you had cooperated, and gives the other player the same payoff as if you had defected.

Your game world implements an "enthusiastic consent" policy