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ESRogs comments on [link] Scott Aaronson on free will - Less Wrong
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Is there an existing principled explanation for why this is not relevant to the free will debate, but predicting less obvious behaviors is?
Because any working system evolved from self-preservation would do that. It doesn't add any bit of information, although it's a prediction that has striking accuracy.
That seems to have already conceded the point by acknowledging that our behaviors are determined by systems. No?
It seems that the argument must be that some of our behaviors are determined and some are the result of free will -- I'm wondering if there's a principled defense of this distinction.
They way I see it is this: if pressing a button of your choice is not an expression of free-will, then nothing is, because otherwise you can just say that free-will determines whatever in the brain is determined by quantum noise, so that it becomes an empty concept.
That said, it's true that we don't know very much about the inner working of the brain, but I believe that we know enough to say that it doesn't store and uses quantum bits for elaboration.
But even before invoking that, Lisbet-like experiments directly link free-will with available neuronal data: I'm not saying that it's a direct refutation, but it's a possible direct refutation.
My pet-peeves is the author not acknowledging the conclusion, instead saying that the experiments were not impressive enough to constitute a refutation of his claim.