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Manfred comments on [link] Scott Aaronson on free will - Less Wrong
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Simple but misleading.
This is because Newcomb's problem is not reliant on the predictor being perfectly accurate. All they need to do is predict you so well that people who one-box walk away with more expected utility than people who two-box. This is easy - even humans can predict other humans this well (though we kinda evolved to be good at it).
So if it's still worth it to one-box even if you're not being copied, what good is an argument that relies on you being copied to work?
In response to this, I want to roll back to saying that while you may not actually be simulated, having the programming to one-box is what causes there to be a million dollars in there. But, I guess that's the basic intuition behind one-boxing/the nature of prediction anyway so nothing non-trivial is left (except the increased ability to explain it to non-LW people).
Also, the calculation here is wrong.
Ok, in that case, am I allowed to roll a dice to determine whether to one box?
Depends on the rules. Who do I look like, Gary Drescher?
What sort of rules would you implement to keep Newcomb's problem interesting in the fact of coins that you can't predict?
Why would I want to keep the problem interesting? I want to solve it.
Because the solution to the problem is worthless except to the extent that it establishes your position in an issue it's constructed to illuminate.