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nyan_sandwich comments on Do Earths with slower economic growth have a better chance at FAI? - Less Wrong
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Can we put a lid on this conflation of subjective probability with objective quantum branching please? A deterministic fair coin does not split the world, and neither would a deterministic economic cycle. Or are we taking seriously the possibility that the course of the economy is largely driven by quantum randomness?
EDIT: actually I just noticed that small quantum fluctuations from long ago can result in large differences between branches today. At that point I'm confused about what the anthropics implies we should see, so please excuse my overconfidence above.
I'm certainly taking it seriously, and am somewhat surprised that you're not. Some ways small-sized effects (most likely to "depend" of quantum randomness) can eventually have large-scale impacts:
Isn't everything?
This comment was banned, which looked to me like a probable accident with a moderator click, so I unbanned it. If I am in error can whichever mod PM me after rebanning it?
Naturally if this was an accident, it must have been a quantum random one.
Whether or not quantum randomness drives the course of the economy it's still a really good idea to stop conflating subjective probability and the corresponding notion of possible worlds with quantum/inflationary/whatever many world theories. Rolf's comment doesn't actually do this: I read him as speaking entirely about the anthropic issue. Eliezer, on the other hand, totally is conflating them in the original post.
I understand that there are reasons to think anthropic issues play an essential role in the assignment of subjective probabilities, especially at a decision theoretic level. But given a) subjective uncertainty over whether or not many-worlds is correct, b) our ignorance of how the Born probability rule figures into the relationship and c) the way anthropics skews anticipated experiences I am really suspicious that anyone here is able to answer the question:
People are actually answering
which is not obviously the same thing.
You don't need quantum many worlds for this kind of speculation: e.g. a spatially infinite universe would also do the trick.
As I said:
I agree, subjective uncertainty isn't the same as quantum uncertainty!
On the other hand, there have been rumors that coinflips are not deterministic. See here.