wedrifid comments on Normative uncertainty in Newcomb's problem - Less Wrong

6 Post author: CarlShulman 16 June 2013 02:16AM

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Comment author: wedrifid 16 June 2013 11:19:16AM 1 point [-]

If you're completely confident in one-boxing, then a 1:1 ratio implies that you should be indifferent between one- and two-boxing. If you interpret the original wording as "at what ratio would you be willing to one-box" (instead of "at what ratio would you always insist on one-boxing"), then it makes sense to pick 1:1, since there'd be no reason not to one-box, though also no reason not to two-box.

I had expected the group of people who are confident in one-boxing to also be likely to not be perfectly confident. All correct answers will be some form of ">1". "=1" is an error (assuming they are actually answering the Normative Uncertainty Newcomb's Problem as asked).

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 16 June 2013 10:38:15PM 0 points [-]

I didn't intend "perfectly confident" to imply people literally assigning a probability of 1. It is enough for them to assign a high enough probability that it rounds closer to 1:1 than 1.01:1.

Comment author: wedrifid 17 June 2013 05:23:59AM *  0 points [-]

I didn't intend "perfectly confident" to imply people literally assigning a probability of 1. It is enough for them to assign a high enough probability that it rounds closer to 1:1 than 1.01:1.

That isn't enough. Neither the actual behaviour of rational agents nor those following the instructions Carl gave for the survey (quoted below) would ever choose the bad deal due to rounding error. If people went about one boxing at 0.999:1 I hope you would agree that there is a problem.

What is the lowest payoff ratio below at which you would one-box on Newcomb's problem, given your current subjective beliefs? [Or answer "none" if you would never one-box.]