ThrustVectoring comments on Why one-box? - Less Wrong

7 Post author: PhilosophyStudent 30 June 2013 02:38AM

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Comment author: ThrustVectoring 30 June 2013 03:00:18AM 8 points [-]

The intuition pump that got me to be a very confident one-boxer is the idea of submitting computer code that makes a decision, rather than just making a decision.

In this version, you don't need an Omega - you just need to run the program. It's a lot more obvious that you ought to submit a program that one-boxes than it is obvious that you ought to one-box. You can even justify this choice on causal decision-theory grounds.

With the full Newcomb problem, the causality is a little weird. Just think of yourself as a computer program with partial self-awareness. Deciding whether to one-box or two-box updates the "what kind of decision-making agent am I" node, which also caused Omega to either fill or not fill the opaque box.

Yes, it's wonky causality - usually the future doesn't seem to affect the past. Omega is just so unlikely that given that you're talking to Omega, you can justify all sorts of slightly less unlikely things.

Comment author: PhilosophyStudent 30 June 2013 03:18:35AM 1 point [-]

Okay. As a first point, it's worth noting that the two-boxer would agree that you should submit one-boxing code because they agree that one-boxing is the rational agent type. However, they would disagree that one-boxing is the rational decision. So I agree that this is a good intuition pump but it is not one that anyone denies.

But you go further, you follow this claim up by saying that we should think of causation in Newcomb's problem as being a case where causality is weird (side note: Huw Price presents an argument of this sort, arguing for a particular view of causation in these cases). However, I'm not sure I feel any "intuition pump" force here (I don't see why I should just intuitively find these claims plausible).

Comment author: ThrustVectoring 30 June 2013 03:26:30AM 1 point [-]

it's worth noting that the two-boxer would agree that you should submit one-boxing code because they agree that one-boxing is the rational agent type.

Running one-boxing code is analogous to showing Omega your decision algorithm and then deciding to one-box. If you think you should run code that one-boxes, then by analogy you should decide to one-box.

Comment author: PhilosophyStudent 30 June 2013 03:29:34AM 0 points [-]

Yes. Personally, I think the analogy is too close to pump intuitions (or it doesn't pump my intuitions though perhaps this is just my failure).

The two-boxer will say that if you can choose what code to submit, you should submit one-boxing code but that you shouldn't later run this code. This is the standard claim that you should precommit to one-boxing but should two-boxing in Newcomb's problem itself.

Comment author: Creutzer 30 June 2013 07:52:57AM *  4 points [-]

But the very point is that you can't submit one piece of code and run another. You have to run what you submitted. That, again, is the issue that decisions don't fall from the sky uncaused. The reason why CDT can't get Newcomb's right is that due to its use of surgery on the action node, it cannot conceive of its own choice as predetermined. You are precommitted already just in virtue of what kind of agent/program you are.

Comment author: PhilosophyStudent 30 June 2013 08:28:55AM 1 point [-]

But the very point is that you can't submit one piece of code and run another. You have to run what you submitted.

Yes. So the two-boxer says that you should precommit to later making an irrational decision. This does not require them to say that the decision you are precommitting to is later rational. So the two-boxer would submit the one-boxing code despite the fact that one unfortunate effect of this would be that they would later irrationally run the code (because there are other effects which counteract this).

I'm not saying your argument is wrong (nor am I saying it's right). I'm just saying that the analogy is too close to the original situation to pump intuitions. If people don't already have the one-boxing intuition in Newcomb's problem then the submitting code analogy doesn't seem to me to make things any clearer.

Comment author: pjeby 30 June 2013 11:01:06PM 2 points [-]

the two-boxer says that you should precommit to later making an irrational decision

I think the piece that this hypothetical two-boxer is missing is that they are acting as though the problem is cheating, or alternatively, that the premises can be cheated. That is, that you are able to make a decision that wasn't predictable beforehand. If your decision is predictable, two boxing is irrational, even considered as a single decision.

Try this analogy: instead of predicting your decision in advance, Omega simply scans your brain to determine what to put in the boxes, at the very moment you make the decision.

Does your hypothetical two-boxer still argue that one-boxing in this scenario is "irrational"?

If so, I cannot make sense of their answer. But if not, then the burden falls on the two boxer to explain how this scenario is any different from a prediction made a fraction of a millisecond sooner. How far before or after the point of decision does the decision become "rational" or "irrational" in their mind? (I use quotes here because I cannot think of any coherent definition of those terms that's still consistent with the hypothetical usage.)

Comment author: PhilosophyStudent 30 June 2013 11:38:03PM 1 point [-]

The two-boxer never assumes that the decision isn't predictable. They just say that the prediction can no longer be influenced and so you may as well gain the $1000 from the transparent box.

In terms of your hypothetical scenario, the question for the two-boxer will be whether the decision causally influences the result of this brain scan. If yes, then, the two-boxer will one-box (weird sentence). If no, the two-boxer will two-box.

Comment author: pjeby 01 July 2013 12:02:41AM 3 points [-]

the question for the two-boxer will be whether the decision causally influences the result of this brain scan. If yes, then, the two-boxer will one-box (weird sentence). If no, the two-boxer will two-box.

How would it not causally influence the brain scan? Are you saying two-boxers can make decisions without using their brains? ;-)

In any event, you didn't answer the question I asked, which was at what point in time does the two-boxer label the decision "irrational". Is it still "irrational" in their estimation to two-box, in the case where Omega decides after they do?

Notice that in both cases, the decision arises from information already available: the state of the chooser's brain. So even in the original Newcomb's problem, there is a causal connection between the chooser's brain state and the boxes' contents. That's why I and other people are asking what role time plays: if you are using the correct causal model, where your current brain state has causal influence over your future decision, then the only distinction two-boxers can base their "irrational" label on is time, not causality.

The alternative is to argue that it is somehow possible to make a decision without using your brain, i.e., without past causes having any influence on your decision. You could maybe do that by flipping a coin, but then, is that really a "decision", let alone "rational"?

If a two-boxer argues that their decision cannot cause a past event, they have the causal model wrong. The correct model is one of a past brain state influencing both Omega's decision and your own future decision.

For me, the simulation argument made it obvious that one-boxing is the rational choice, because it makes clear that your decision is algorithmic. "Then I'll just decide differently!" is, you see, still a fixed algorithm. There is no such thing as submitting one program to Omega and then running a different one, because you are the same program in both cases -- and it's that program that is causal over both Omega's behavior and the "choice you would make in that situation". Separating the decision from the deciding algorithm is incoherent.

As someone else mentioned, the only way the two-boxer's statements make any sense is if you can separate a decision from the algorithm used to arrive at that decision. But nobody has presented any concrete theory by which one can arrive at a decision without using some algorithm, and whatever algorithm that is, is your "agent type". It doesn't make any sense to say that you can be the type of agent who decides one way, but when it actually comes to deciding, you'll decide another way.

How does your hypothetical two-boxer respond to simulation or copy arguments? If you have no way of knowing whether you're the simulated version of you, or the real version of you, which decision is rational then?

To put it another way, a two-boxer is arguing that they ought to two-box while simultaneously not being the sort of person who would two-box -- an obvious contradiction. The two-boxer is either arguing for this contradiction, or arguing about the definitions of words by saying "yes, but that's not what 'rational' means".

Indeed, most two-boxers I've seen around here seem to alternate between those two positions, falling back to the other whenever one is successfully challenged.

Comment author: PhilosophyStudent 01 July 2013 12:40:58AM 0 points [-]

In any event, you didn't answer the question I asked, which was at what point in time does the two-boxer label the decision "irrational". Is it still "irrational" in their estimation to two-box, in the case where Omega decides after they do?

Time is irrelevant to the two-boxer except as a proof of causal independence so there's no interesting answer to this question. The two-boxer is concerned with causal independence. If a decision cannot help but causally influence the brain scan then the two-boxer would one-box.

Notice that in both cases, the decision arises from information already available: the state of the chooser's brain. So even in the original Newcomb's problem, there is a causal connection between the chooser's brain state and the boxes' contents. That's why I and other people are asking what role time plays: if you are using the correct causal model, where your current brain state has causal influence over your future decision, then the only distinction two-boxers can base their "irrational" label on is time, not causality.

Two-boxers use a causal model where your current brain state has causal influence on your future decisions. They are interested in the causal effects of the decision not the brain state and hence the causal independence criterion does distinguish the cases in their view and they need not appeal to time.

If a two-boxer argues that their decision cannot cause a past event, they have the causal model wrong. The correct model is one of a past brain state influencing both Omega's decision and your own future decision.

They have the right causal model. They just disagree about which downstream causal effects we should be considering.

For me, the simulation argument made it obvious that one-boxing is the rational choice, because it makes clear that your decision is algorithmic. "Then I'll just decide differently!" is, you see, still a fixed algorithm. There is no such thing as submitting one program to Omega and then running a different one, because you are the same program in both cases -- and it's that program that is causal over both Omega's behavior and the "choice you would make in that situation". Separating the decision from the deciding algorithm is incoherent.

No-one denies this. Everyone agrees about what the best program is. They just disagree about what this means about the best decision. The two-boxer says that unfortunately the best program leads us to make a non-optimal decision which is a shame (but worth it because the benefits outweigh the cost). But, they say, this doesn't change the fact that two-boxing is the optimal decision (while acknowledging that the optimal program one-boxes).

How does your hypothetical two-boxer respond to simulation or copy arguments? If you have no way of knowing whether you're the simulated version of you, or the real version of you, which decision is rational then?

I suspect that different two-boxers would respond differently as anthropic style puzzles tend to elicit disagreement.

To put it another way, a two-boxer is arguing that they ought to two-box while simultaneously not being the sort of person who would two-box -- an obvious contradiction. The two-boxer is either arguing for this contradiction, or arguing about the definitions of words by saying "yes, but that's not what 'rational' means".

Well, they're saying that the optimal algorithm is a one-boxing algorithm while the optimal decision is two-boxing. They can explain why as well (algorithms have different causal effects to decisions). There is no immediate contradiction here (it would take serious argument to show a contradiction like, for example, an argument showing that decisions and algorithms are the same thing). For example, imagine a game where I choose a colour and then later choose a number between 1 and 4. With regards to the number, if you pick n, you get $n. With regards to the colour, if you pick red, you get $0, if you pick blue you get $5 but then don't get a choice about the number (you are presumed to have picked 1). It is not contradictory to say that the optimal number to pick is 1 but the optimal colour to pick is blue. The two-boxer is saying something pretty similar here.

What "ought" you do, according to the two-boxer. Well that depends what decision you're facing. If you're facing a decision about what algorithm to adopt, then adopt the optimal algorithm (which one-boxers on all future versions of NP though not ones where the prediction has occurred). If you are not able to choose between algorithms but are just choosing a decision for this occasion then choose two-boxing. They do not give contradictory advice.