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stcredzero comments on [HPMOR][Possible Spoilers] Gedankenexperiment: Time Turner Meta-Informational Relativity - Less Wrong
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All information is probabilistic, Bayesian. Two scenarios, A & B, may have identical effects, but if the relevant probability ratios are different, then observing this effect can still give you information. If Amelia Bones tells Dumbledore that she's come from six hours in the future, then his objective Bayesian probability (given the information that he possesses) that she'll survive the next six hours goes up, even though it doesn't rise to 100%. And all information is like this; objective Bayesian probability is never quite 100%.
Is there a rigorous argument for this, or is this just a very powerful way of modeling the world?
In discussions here (ETA: meaning, in the Less Wrong community), I mostly take it for granted that people have adopted the Bayesian perspective promoted in Eliezer's sequences. I think that one can make a pretty good argument (although mathematical rigour is too much to ask for) that receiving information through one's senses can never be enough to justify absolute certainty about anything external. But I'd rather not try to make it here (ETA: meaning, in this discussion thread).
It's more that Bayesian Analysis is a technique you can apply on anything, and under certain conditions is useful.