Qiaochu_Yuan comments on Evidential Decision Theory, Selection Bias, and Reference Classes - Less Wrong
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No. For example, AIXI is what I would regard as essentially a Bayesian agent, but it has a notion of causality because it has a notion of the environment taking its actions as an input. What I mean is more like wondering if AIXI would invent causal networks.
I think this is too narrow a way to describe the mistake that naive EDT is making. First, I hope you agree that even naive EDT wouldn't use statistical correlations in a population of agents completely unrelated to it (for example, agents who make their decisions randomly). But naive EDT may be in the position of existing in a world where it is the only naive EDT agent, although there may be many agents which are similar but not completely identical to it. How should it update in this situation? It might try to pick a population of agents sufficiently similar to itself, but then it's unclear how the fact that they're similar but not identical should be taken into account.
AIXI, by contrast, would do something more sophisticated. Namely, its observations about the environment, including other agents similar to itself, would all update its model of the environment.
It seems like some variant of the tickle defense covers this. Once the other agent professes their inclination to smoke, that screens off any further information obtained by the other agent smoking or not smoking.
I guess AIXI could do something like start with a prior over possible models of how various actions, including smoking, could affect the other agent, update, then use the posterior distribution over models to predict the effect of interventions like smoking. But this requires a lot more data than is usually given in the smoking lesion problem.
This looks like a symptom of AIXI's inability to self-model. Of course causality is going to look fundamental when you think you can magically intervene from outside the system.
Do you share the intuition I mention in my other comment? I feel that they way this post reframes CDT and TDT as attempts to clarify bad self-modelling by naive EDT is very similar to the way I would reframe Pearl's positions as an attempt to clarify bad self-modelling by naive probability theory a la AIXI.
So your intuition is that causality isn't fundamental but should fall out of correct self-modeling? I guess that's also my intuition, and I also don't know how to make that precise.