This does not mean the theory has "huge problems" dealing with real world events! It just lacks the power to distinguish between causes from within the set Y.
Then it's not a theory capable of explaining the event at all. If all you can do is throw together a variety of heterogenous contradictory theories, you haven't explained an event.
I'm reminded of Wittgenstein, now, on family resemblances - of course one could define "a game" as an indefinitely long disjunction of possibilities "a game is anything which is either Backgammon OR chess OR go OR Halo OR tossing a ball OR soccer..." but having giving this disjunction, in what sense has one actually conveyed what a game is? Same thing here.
In the same way, economists argue about the causes of things like the Great Depression, Lost Decade, and Great Recession, but they mostly agree about the sort of causes they need to consider, and they have a common framework to think about them in (or at worst a few competing frameworks).
I believe that however we explain the Lost Decades, it will involve materialism and not souls. Do I have a perfectly satisfactory theory capable of explaining the Lost Decades? No, of course not.
Then it's not a theory capable of explaining the event at all.
Are you really claiming that a theory that restricts the possible causes of an event to three has not explained the event "at all"?
Under this definition, I agree that undergraduate macroeconomics cannot explain the real world. But surely this is a rather restrictive standard for "explanation"?
I would rather say that a theory that allows us to concentrate a lot of probability mass on Y upon observing an element in X, or to concentrate a lot of probability mass on X after observing an element in Y, is doing quite a bit of explanatory work!
I took an economics course recently. And by "took a course" I mean followed a series of online lectures. I can strongly recommend doing so, especially if you already think you have an intuitive grasp of economics.
I was in that situation. I knew about incentives, and revealed preferences. I understood that supply and demand curves crossed. I grasped some of the monetarist arguments about the lack of long run tradeoffs between inflation and employment. I could talk about Keynesian stimulus and sticky prices/wages. I understood bank runs. Externalities were obvious, public goods a bit less so. I even knew quite a lot about banks and the money supply.
I had it pretty good, I thought. And yet when I followed basic economics lecture, I learnt a lot. The models and concepts suddenly fit together. I understood concepts that I only thought I had understood before. Economists do know their stuff, their models and concepts are informative - more so than I ever expected.
So, bearing in mind that economics is a social science whose conclusions are not nearly as rigorous as its models, I can recommend to anyone on Less Wrong who's interested to follow a lecture series or take a course.
The lecture series I followed was this one, by Professor Kenneth E. Train (the first lecture can be skipped). The most useful potential insight of all was in a brief throw-away comment in lecture 22: many economist think that the unemployment rate is determined entirely by macro-economic policy (and probably by the business cycle). So all the articles you might read about new industries "creating" jobs, or about some people becoming unemployable because of the "loss" of certain types of jobs: according to some some economists, all these articles are wrong. These trends affect who is employed versus unemployed, and conditions and wages, but not the unemployment rate across the business cycle. An interesting idea, worth thinking about.
Here are some brief notes on each lecture (useful for revision):
That's the end of micro-economics, the rest are about macro-economics:
And in conclusion: