suppose [...] a convincing argument that without the [X] the odds of human extinction due to [Y] are at least 10% (with high confidence), and that the [X] can reduce the odds to, say, 1% (again, with high confidence), then I would possibly reevaluate my attitude.
I don't think the hypothetical is true (by a large margin the expected impact is too big), but why only "possibly"? A high confidence intervention to avert a 9% risk of human extinction (for far less than 9% of world GDP) would be ludicrously good by normal standards.
Do you mean that "high confidence" is only conditional on the "convincing" argument, but "convincing" corresponds to relatively low confidence in the arguments itself? What is the hypothetical here?
I don't think the hypothetical is true (by a large margin)
"A large margin" which way?
but why only "possibly"?
"Possibly" because:
I'd have to reevaluate the odds again, the confidence and my confidence in my confidence (probably no more meta than that) before actually changing my behavior based on that
compare with other potential x-risks prevention measures which can pop up at the same level of surprise when evaluated as thoroughly and at the same level
even if convinced that yes, AI indeed has a 10% or more chance o
I'm currently working on a research project for MIRI, and I would welcome feedback on my research as I proceed. In this post, I describe the project.
As a part of an effort to steel-man objections to MIRI's mission, MIRI Executive Director Luke Muehlhauser has asked me to develop the following objection:
In Luke's initial email to me, he wrote:
Luke and I brainstormed a list of potential historical examples of people predicting the future 10+ years out, and using the predictions to inform their actions. We came up with the following potential examples, which I've listed in chronological order by approximate year: