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AspiringRationalist comments on Risk-Free Bonds Aren't - Less Wrong
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If you buy a share of such a cache, what makes you think you would actually receive what you've purchased when the time comes, given that there will probably not be a functioning government to enforce property rights?
Schelling points. Only so many can fit in a given bunker, so some people must be excluded; excluding all those who did not sign up in advance, and only those, is a very straightforward place to draw the line.
Also, the group already inside the bunker is depending on commitments to each other. If the decision to exclude people is less than unanimous, there could be an internal breakdown of trust at the worst possible time.
That said, being able to reach the bunker entrance under your own power, bringing some extra supplies and/or blackmail materials along as bargaining chips, having a slot reserved at more than one independent fortification, etc. would be sensible hedging strategies.
Another obvious Schelling point is to exclude all but those with the most political, social or physical power (whichever of those seems to be the dominant factor at the time). I don't particularly like that Schelling point but it is the one humans follow by default.
That's why I mentioned hedging strategies.
Even if having signed up in advance is not actually a sufficient condition for entry when the time comes, it can still be useful. Whatever coercion you manage to apply, the guard can rationalize by thinking of it as a matter of simply honoring your original reservation.