Spurlock comments on Making Beliefs Pay Rent (in Anticipated Experiences) - Less Wrong

110 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 28 July 2007 10:59PM

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Comment author: MoreOn 25 February 2011 06:45:42PM *  4 points [-]

But why do beliefs need to pay rent in anticipated experiences? Why can’t they pay rent in utility?

If some average Joe believes he’s smart and beautiful, and that gives him utility, is that necessarily a bad thing? Joe approaches a girl in a bar, dips his sweaty fingers in her iced drink, cracks a piece of ice in his teeth, pulls it out of his mouth, shoves it in her face for demonstration, and says, “Now that I’d broken the ice—”

She thinks: “What a butt-ugly idiot!” and gets the hell away from him.

Joe goes on happily believing that he’s smart and beautiful.

For myself, the answer is obvious: my beliefs are means to an end, not ends in themselves. They’re utility producers only insofar as they help me accomplish utility-producing operations. If I were to buy stock believing that its price would go up, I better hope my belief paid its rent in correct anticipation, or else it goes out the door.

But for Joe? If he has utility-pumping beliefs, then why not? It’s not like he would get any smarter or prettier by figuring out he’s been a butt-ugly idiot this whole time.

Comment author: Spurlock 25 February 2011 07:40:26PM *  4 points [-]

It's sort of taken for granted here that it is in general better to have correct beliefs (though there have been some discussions as to why this is the case). It may be that there are specific (perhaps contrived) situations where this is not the case, but in general, so far as we can tell, having the map that matches the territory is a big win in the utility department.

In Joe's case, it may be that he is happier thinking he's beautiful than he is thinking he is ugly. And it may be that, for you, correct beliefs are not themselves terminal values (ends in themselves). But in both cases, having correct beliefs can still produce utility. Joe for example might make a better effort to improve his appearance, might be more likely to approach girls who are in his league and at his intellectual level, thereby actually finding some sort of romantic fulfillment instead of just scaring away disinterested ladies. He might also not put all his eggs in the "underwear model" and "astrophysicist" baskets career-wise. You can further twist the example to remove these advantages, but then we're just getting further and further from reality.

Overall, the consensus seems to be that wrong beliefs can often be locally optimal (meaning that giving them up might result in a temporary utility loss, or that you can lose utility by not shifting them far enough towards truth), but a maximally rational outlook will pay off in the long run.