Blarg... okay this one is tripping me up. There are two parts to this comment. The first part is quasi-math; the other is not. It is very much a brain dump and I have not edited it thoroughly.

EDIT: I think I managed to get it cleared up and responded with a second comment. FYI.

Let B(X) mean belief in X where belief is defined as a predictor of reality so that reality contains event X. Using "There is a dragon in my garage" as X we get:

• B("There is a dragon in my garage.")
• B("There is not a dragon in my garage.")

I think it is okay to write the latter as:

• B(~X) where X is "There is a dragon in my garage."

So far okay and both can be verified. The problem comes when X is "There is an unverifiable dragon in my garage."

• B("There is an unverifiable dragon in my garage.")
• B("There is not an unverifiable dragon in my garage.")

Both of these are unverifiable, but the latter is okay because it matches reality? As in, we see no unverifiable dragon so the ~X is... what, the default? This confuses me. Perhaps my notation is wrong. Is it better to write:

• B(X)
• ~B(X)

If B(X) is belief in X, B(~X) != ~B(X). This way we can throw out the unverifiable belief without creating a second unverifiable belief. All of this makes sense to me. Am I still on track with the intent of the post? This implies that B(X) and B(~X) are equally unverifiable when X is unverifiable.

Next is belief in belief:

• B(B(X))

Of which I think you are arguing that B(B(X)) does not imply B(X). But are you also saying that B(X) implies B(B(X))? And this is how people can continue to believe in something unverifiable?

I feel like I am drifting far away from the purpose of this post. Where did I misstep?

Here is my second attempt, this time with no math:

Carl Sagan used this parable to illustrate the classic moral that poor hypotheses need to do fast footwork to avoid falsification. But I tell this parable to make a different point: The claimant must have an accurate model of the situation somewhere in his mind, because he can anticipate, in advance, exactly which experimental results he'll need to excuse.

Would there be any experimental results that he wouldn't need to excuse? Is there some form of invisiodragonometer that beeps when he goes into his garage? Would the scenario change any if the subject was genuinely surprised when no sounds of breathing were heard and the oxygen levels remained the same and still offered up excuses of inaudible and non-breathing? How would the typical believer in atoms defend their existence if we wandered into the garage and complained about no breathing sounds?

I can think of simple answers to all of these questions, but it makes me think less of the usefulness of your conclusion. When I think of unverifiable beliefs I think of examples where people will spend their whole life looking for physical proof and are constantly disappointed when they do not find it. These people don't have an accurate model of the situation in their mind. The example of invisible dragons still applies to these people while your claim that they dodge in advance does not seem to apply.

So... again, I feel like I am missing some key point here.

[I]f you believe in belief, you cannot admit to yourself that you only believe in belief, because it is virtuous to believe, not to believe in belief, and so if you only believe in belief, instead of believing, you are not virtuous. Nobody will admit to themselves, "I don't believe the Ultimate Cosmic Sky is blue and green, but I believe I ought to believe it" - not unless they are unusually capable of acknowledging their own lack of virtue. People don't believe in belief in belief, they just believe in belief.

I can think of examples where someone fully admits that they believe it would be better to believe X but as hard as they try and as much as they want to, they cannot. These people are often guilt ridden and have horrible, conflicting desires, but it doesn't take much imagination to think of someone who simply states the belief in belief X without emotion but admits to not believing X. At least, I can hear myself saying these words given the right circumstances.

Believing in belief of belief seems like something else entirely unrelated to dragons in garages or unverifiable beleifs. This, again, makes me feel as if I am missing a crucial piece of understanding throughout all of this. If I had to potshot at the missing pieces I would aim toward the definitions of belief. Specifically, what you are calling beliefs aside from predictors of reality. (And even there, I do not know if I have a correct translation.)

I do not know if you have any desire to discuss this subject with me. Perhaps someone else who knows the material is willing? I sincerely apologize if these types of responses are frustrating. This is how I ask for help. If there is a better way to ask I am all ears.