I think that Yudkowsky, hubris nonetheless, has made a few mistakes in his own reasoning.
A: "I don't believe Artificial Intelligence is possible because only God can make a soul." B: "You mean if I can make an Artificial Intelligence, it proves your religion is false?"
I don't see at all how this follows. At best, this would only show A's belief about what only God can or cannot do is mistaken. Concluding this entails their belief is false is purely fallacious reasoning. Imagine the following situation:
A: "I don't believe entanglement is possible because quantum mechanics shows non-locality is impossible." B: "You mean if I can show entanglement is possible, it proves quantum mechanics is false?"
This is not a case of quantum mechanics being false, but rather a case of A's knowledge of what quantum mechanics does and does not show being false.
What you believe or don't believe about quantum mechanics or God is irrelevant to this point. The point is that the conclusion Yudkowsky made was, at best, hastily and incorrectly arrived at. Of course, saying that "if your religion predicts that I can't possibly make an Artificial Intelligence, then, if I make an Artificial Intelligence, it means your religion is false" is sound reasoning and a simple example of modus tollens. But that is not, as far as I can see, what A said.
A: "I didn't mean that you couldn't make an intelligence, just that it couldn't be emotional in the same way we are." B: "So if I make an Artificial Intelligence that, without being deliberately preprogrammed with any sort of script, starts talking about an emotional life that sounds like ours, that means your religion is wrong."
There again seems to be invalid reasoning at work here. Whether or not an AI entity can 'start talking' about an emotional life that sounds like ours has nothing to do with the comment made by A, which was about whether or not such AI entities could actually be emotional in the same way organic beings are.
I think the "strictly implies" may be stealing a base.
Yes, being convinced of the existence of the AI would make the man rethink the aspects of his religion that he believes renders an AI impossible, but he could update that and keep the rest. From his perspective, he'd have the same religion, but updated to account for the belief in AIs.
You can have some fun with people whose anticipations get out of sync with what they believe they believe.
I was once at a dinner party, trying to explain to a man what I did for a living, when he said: "I don't believe Artificial Intelligence is possible because only God can make a soul."
At this point I must have been divinely inspired, because I instantly responded: "You mean if I can make an Artificial Intelligence, it proves your religion is false?"
He said, "What?"
I said, "Well, if your religion predicts that I can't possibly make an Artificial Intelligence, then, if I make an Artificial Intelligence, it means your religion is false. Either your religion allows that it might be possible for me to build an AI; or, if I build an AI, that disproves your religion."
There was a pause, as the one realized he had just made his hypothesis vulnerable to falsification, and then he said, "Well, I didn't mean that you couldn't make an intelligence, just that it couldn't be emotional in the same way we are."
I said, "So if I make an Artificial Intelligence that, without being deliberately preprogrammed with any sort of script, starts talking about an emotional life that sounds like ours, that means your religion is wrong."
He said, "Well, um, I guess we may have to agree to disagree on this."
I said: "No, we can't, actually. There's a theorem of rationality called Aumann's Agreement Theorem which shows that no two rationalists can agree to disagree. If two people disagree with each other, at least one of them must be doing something wrong."
We went back and forth on this briefly. Finally, he said, "Well, I guess I was really trying to say that I don't think you can make something eternal."
I said, "Well, I don't think so either! I'm glad we were able to reach agreement on this, as Aumann's Agreement Theorem requires." I stretched out my hand, and he shook it, and then he wandered away.
A woman who had stood nearby, listening to the conversation, said to me gravely, "That was beautiful."
"Thank you very much," I said.
Part of the sequence Mysterious Answers to Mysterious Questions
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