I have so far distinguished between belief as anticipation-controller, belief in belief, professing and cheering. Of these, we might call anticipation-controlling beliefs "proper beliefs" and the other forms "improper belief". Proper belief can be wrong or irrational, as when someone genuinely anticipates that prayer will cure their sick baby. But the other forms are arguably “not belief at all.”
Yet another form of improper belief is belief as group identification—as a way of belonging. Robin Hanson uses the excellent metaphor of wearing unusual clothing, a group uniform like a priest’s vestments or a Jewish skullcap, and so I will call this “belief as attire.”
In terms of humanly realistic psychology, the Muslims who flew planes into the World Trade Center undoubtedly saw themselves as heroes defending truth, justice, and the Islamic Way from hideous alien monsters a la the movie Independence Day. Only a very inexperienced nerd, the sort of nerd who has no idea how non-nerds see the world, would say this out loud in an Alabama bar. It is not an American thing to say. The American thing to say is that the terrorists “hate our freedom” and that flying a plane into a building is a “cowardly act.” You cannot say the phrases “heroic self-sacrifice” and “suicide bomber” in the same sentence, even for the sake of accurately describing how the Enemy sees the world. The very concept of the courage and altruism of a suicide bomber is Enemy attire—you can tell, because the Enemy talks about it. The cowardice and sociopathy of a suicide bomber is American attire. There are no quote marks you can use to talk about how the Enemy sees the world; it would be like dressing up as a Nazi for Halloween.
Belief-as-attire may help explain how people can be passionate about improper beliefs. Mere belief in belief, or religious professing, would have some trouble creating genuine, deep, powerful emotional effects. Or so I suspect; I confess I’m not an expert here. But my impression is this: People who’ve stopped anticipating-as-if their religion is true, will go to great lengths to convince themselves they are passionate, and this desperation can be mistaken for passion. But it’s not the same fire they had as a child.
On the other hand, it is very easy for a human being to genuinely, passionately, gut-level belong to a group, to cheer for their favorite sports team.1 Identifying with a tribe is a very strong emotional force. People will die for it. And once you get people to identify with a tribe, the beliefs which are the attire of that tribe will be spoken with the full passion of belonging to that tribe.
1 This is the foundation on which rests the swindle of “Republicans vs. Democrats” and analogous false dilemmas in other countries, but that’s a topic for another time.
"Eliezer's characterization describes a large minority of Americans very well."
All I see there are familiar platitudes, not a description of anybody who thinks about things. All I see, in fact, are familiar formulas employed by politicians. Nor are the formulas necessarily wrong. It should not be hard to see what is cowardly about most terrorist attacks.
American Heritage has a fairly good definition of cowardice: "Ignoble fear in the face of danger or pain."
The ignobility is an important factor which other dictionaries tend to miss. But American Heritage misses something that Cambridge has: "a person who is too eager to avoid danger, difficulty or pain"
It does not have to be danger and pain, it can be difficulty. So in a nutshell, a coward is someone who commits a discreditable act in order to avoid a difficulty (which might be pain or danger but might be something else). In the case of terrorists, the discreditable act is an attack on civilians, and the difficulty thereby avoided is the difficulty of engaging the enemy's armed forces. Similarly, it is cowardly to break certain Geneva conventions, for example disguising yourself as, and mixing with, civilians, to thereby shield yourself from the enemy, is cowardly, because you are committing a discreditable act (using civilians as shields) in order to avoid difficulty (greater exposure to enemy fire).
I will quote an old essay on the topic and answer some key points.
http://www.slate.com/id/1008268/
"Perhaps the idea is that it is cowardly to make a sneak attack, especially on a defenseless civilian target, rather than confront an armed enemy face to face. But no one seriously expects Osama Bin Laden to invite the 101st Airborne to fight his terrorist organization on equal terms."
The first sentence is a fair summary of the point I just made, but the second sentence is no answer. Compare the above with the following:
"Perhaps the idea is that rape is forcible sexual intercourse. But no one seriously expects Ugly Albert to get sex any other way than by forcing the girl."
The fact that the only possible way to succeed is discreditable or illegal or immoral, is no answer to the point that it is nevertheless discreditable or illegal or immoral. It is still what it is, even if it is the only way. If the only way to make a mark is a cowardly way, that makes it no less cowardly.
"And besides, the reason we usually consider it cowardly to make a sneak attack is because the attacker avoids facing the consequences."
Not necessarily. As the Chambers dictionary correctly recognized, what is necessary is an avoidance of a difficulty. It does not have to be specifically "facing the consequences".
So it should be fairly easy to see that it is not incorrect to say that the terrorists are cowards. It is furthermore, then, not incorrect to say that if someone says the terrorists are not cowards, then he is wrong.
But backing up, even though I have defended the familiar platitude that terrorist attacks are cowardly, nevertheless I do not think this accurately reflects man in the street thinking on the topic. Rather, it represents an old political formula that has caught on and that hardly makes a ripple. It's about as meaningful as saying "good morning". It is not significant to say it; it would be significant to stop saying it. Same as "good morning." We say that in order to avoid doing anything significant. It is a distant cousin of the "dead metaphor" - a metaphor that has lost its force through overuse. But like the dead metaphor, its overuse does not mean that it is not valid.
Setting this aside, there is also the matter of the habit that some intellectuals have of shocking the bourgeoisie. If you say that the bad guys think that they're the good guys and we're the bad guys, you probably won't raise any eyebrows. But if you make the statement in a way that implies that you agree with the bad guys' assessment, or that you are positioning yourself as a neutral party who favors neither side, then you will probably raise some eyebrows. And based on my own experience, an awful lot of people like to present the rather familiar and tired and unremarkable view that the bad guys think that they're the good guys, in just such a way, so as to maximize their effect on their listener. This seeming undercurrent of support for the enemy is something that can be easily avoided without changing the factual content of what you're saying, but it is in my experience often not avoided, indeed, it seems to be sought out and nurtured. And then, when the predictable reaction occurs, like clockwork Mr. Epater-les-bourgeois loudly complains about the impossibility of making obviously true statements in front of the the foolish masses.
I agree with your point about "difficulty of engaging the enemy's armed forces". But I still understand the frustrations of suicide bombers, because of the difficulty of significantly or meaningfully engaging some enemy's armed forces. Especially if you respect warriors, but not their guidance.
What is the brave action to take in that case? Simply suicide, and not suicide-attacks? Or better-targeted suicide-attacks? I am befuddled.
I am far more comfortable condemning suicide-attacks as irrational than cowardly.