eliminativism is true, and qualia are an illusion

I wasn't aware of eliminativism. After reading the wikipedia page, eliminativism seems to be nothing more than reductionism applied to the philosophy of mind, but I don't see what problems reductionism poses for qualia. I don't think that I'm missing a logical step, nor do I feel confused on this genre of philosophical issues. So if many people perceive that qualia and reductionism are incompatible, my current hypothesis is that "qualia' has some sort of definitional connotation attached to it that I'm not aware of, which somehow interferes with reductionism. I'd like to be informed about these connotations.

I guess "experience" is the most innocent word? Honestly, "Qualia", "(Subjective) experience", and "(save the) Phenomenon" all seem precisely identical to me, and I only use "qualia" because it's short and doesn't have any other definitions. If it's picked up additional connotations, then I'll have to find a new label for what I will temporarily call "Property Q, which separates counterfactual mathematical structures from reality".