sentientplatypus comments on Torture vs Dust Specks Yet Again - Less Wrong
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I just want to say thanks to everyone for your comments and I now realize the obvious flaw of incorporating any extremely personal connection into a mathematical morality calculation. Because, as BlueSun pointed out that causes problems on whatever scale of pain involved.
I also learned not to grandstand on morality questions. Sorry, about the "would you do it? really?" argument, I won't do that again.
However, I still fall on the side of the dust specks after rethinking the issue, but due to the reasoning that the 3^^^3 individuals would probably be willing to suffer the dust specks to save someone from torture, while the tortured person wouldn't likely be willing to be tortured to save others from dust specks.
I'm somewhat sympathetic to your position, but I'm curious:
1) Which side do you think you'd come down on if it were (3^^^3 / 1 billion) dust specks vs (50 / 1 billion) years (= 1.6 seconds) of torture?
2) How about the same (3^^^3 / 1 billion) dust specks and (50 / 1 billion) years of torture but the dust specks were divided among (3^^^3 / (billion^2)) people so that each received 1 billion dust specks?
EDIT: I think these questions weren't very clear about what I was getting at. Eliezer's argument from Circular Altruism is along the lines of what I was going for, but much more well developed:
Well, torture is highly nonlinear, so utility((50 years / billion) of torture ) is much milder than utility(50 years of torture)/billion.
As for #2, the you're leaving the LCPW for the original problem. Dustspecks are also nonlinear.
Hmm, going back and reading Circular Altruism, Eliezer's argument really seems to be predicated on linearity, doesn't it?
EDIT: Oops, read it again. You guys are right, it's not.
The main argument is predicated on linearity of probability. Probability is linear. I was pointing out the way the suggested comparison does not satisfy this.
It's not.
I am basing my reasoning on the probable preferences of those involved, so my answer would depend on the feelings of the people to being dust specked/tortured.
I'm not entirely clear what exactly you are asking with number 1: are you just asking 1.6 seconds of torture vs. 3^^^3/ 1 billion dust specks? If so, I'm essentially indifferent, it seems like both are fairly inconsequential as long as the torture only causes pain for the 1.6 seconds.
For number 2, a billion dust specks would probably get to be fairly noticeable in succession, so I'd prefer to get 1.6 seconds of torture over with, because that isn't really enough time for it actually to really be torturous (depending on what exactly that torture was) rather than deal with a constant annoyance.