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Juno_Watt comments on How sure are you that brain emulations would be conscious? - Less Wrong
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"Biological" could be taken as a place holder for the idea that there are very specific, but unknown, bits of phsycis and chemistry involved in consciousness. That there are specific but known bits of physics and chemistry involved in some things is unconentious: you can't make a magnet or superconductor out of just anything, You can, however, implement an abstract function, or computer out of just about anything, Hence the Blockhead objection to functionalism (etc).
This. Conscious experiences are a cause of behavior; they are not the behavior itself. We can get acceleration of iron particles toward an object without magnetism being the cause. Similarly, we should leave open the possibility that complex goal-oriented behavior is possible in the absence of experiences like pain, pleasure, itches, etc.
I don't see the relevance. I was trying to argue that bioloigical claim could be read as more specific than the functional one.
I was agreeing. And trying to elaborate the magnetism analogy. I'm looking to break the hold that functionalism has on so many lesswrongers, but I'm not sure how to go about it.