ikrase comments on How sure are you that brain emulations would be conscious? - Less Wrong

15 Post author: ChrisHallquist 26 August 2013 06:21AM

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Comment author: ikrase 26 August 2013 07:46:06AM 5 points [-]

I'm more worried that an upload of me would not be me me than that an upload would not be conscious.

Comment author: MugaSofer 26 August 2013 05:22:36PM 0 points [-]

Care to elaborate on why?

Comment author: summerstay 26 August 2013 06:00:31PM 0 points [-]

It's a life and death matter: if the upload won't be ikrase, then he will be killed in the process of uploading. Naturally he doesn't care as much about whether or not a new person will be created than whether he will continue to exist.

Comment author: ikrase 27 August 2013 03:14:23AM 2 points [-]

If I am killed in the process of uploading (thus creating an immortal child of my mind), that is far, far, far, better than dying utterly, but not as good as continuous consciousness. In particular, most uploading techniques seem like they would allow the unlimited duplication of people and would not necessarily destroy the original, which worries me. (Hanson cites this as an advantage of the em-verse, which convinces me of his immorality). However, I am not yet convinced that I would be willing to casually upload.