You aren't just "data", you are a particular being who persists in time. But you will never know this via "LessWrong philosophy" if the latter is understood as requiring that you presuppose physics, computation, a timeless multiverse, etc., in order to analyse anything. To get even just a glimpse of this truth, you have to notice that experienced reality involves realities like the existence of someone (you) who "knows" things and for whom time flows; and you may have to kick out certain habits of automatically substituting static abstractions for lived experience, whenever you want to think about reality.
Conceivably a "wrongosopher" could still arrive at such perspectives, if they had tuned into the parts of the Sequences that are about paying attention to the feelings of rightness and wrongness that accompany various thoughts, and if they had tuned out all the "scientistic" conceptual triumphalism that tramples over unscientific subjectivity. But since the habit of treating anything about consciousness that is odd from the perspective of scientific ontology, as just an illusion and/or a sort of computational annotation made by the brain, is very widespread, this hypothetical philosophical prodigy would have to be seeing past the everyday beliefs of contemporary scientific culture, and not just past the everyday beliefs of Less Wrong.
... you will never know this via "LessWrong philosophy" if the latter is understood as requiring that you presuppose physics, computation, a timeless multiverse, etc., in order to analyse anything.
Good news! You don't!
Although Elizier has dealt with personal identity questions (in terms of ruling out the body theory), he has not actually, as far as I know, "solved" the problem of Personal Identity as it is understood in philosophy. Nor, as far as I know, has any thinker (Robin Hanson, Yvain, etc) broadly in the same school of thought.
Why do I think it worth solving? One- Lesswrong has a tradition of trying to solve all of philosophy through thinking better than philosophers do. Even when I don't agree with it, the result is often enlightening. Two- What counts as 'same person' could easily have significant implications for large numbers of ethical dilemnas, and thus for Lesswrongian ethics.
Three- most importantly of all, the correct theory has practical implications for cryonics. I don't know enough to assert any theory as actually true, but if, say, Identity as Continuity of Form rather than of Matter were the true theory it would mean that preserving only the mental data would not be enough. What kind of preservation is necessary also varies somewhat- the difference in requirement based on a Continuity of Consciousness v.s a Continuity of Psyche theory, for example should be obvious.
I'm curious what people here think. What is the correct answer? No-self theory? Psyche theory? Derek Parfit's theory in some manner? Or if there is a correct way to dissolve the question, what is that correct way?