David_Chapman comments on Probability, knowledge, and meta-probability - Less Wrong

38 Post author: David_Chapman 17 September 2013 12:02AM

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Comment author: Jonathan_Lee 14 September 2013 08:40:02PM 4 points [-]

The substantive point here isn't about EU calculations per se. Running a full analysis of everything that might happen and doing an EU calculation on that basis is fine, and I don't think the OP disputes this.

The subtlety is about what numerical data can formally represent your full state of knowledge. The claim is that a mere probability of getting the $2 payout does not. It's the case that on the first use of a box, the probability of the payout given its colour is 0.45 regardless of the colour.

However, if you merely hold onto that probability, then if you put in a coin and so learn something about the boxes you can't update that probability to figure out what the probability of payout for the second attempt is. You need to go back and also remember whether the box is green or brown. The point of Jaynes and the A_p distribution is that it actually does screen off all other information. If you keep track of it you never need to worry about remembering the colour of the box, or the setup of the experiment. Just this "meta-distribution".

Comment author: David_Chapman 14 September 2013 09:10:04PM 2 points [-]

Thanks, Jonathan, yes, that's how I understand it.

Jaynes' discussion motivates A_p as an efficiency hack that allows you to save memory by forgetting some details. That's cool, although not the point I'm trying to make here.