gjm comments on Three ways CFAR has changed my view of rationality - Less Wrong

102 Post author: Julia_Galef 10 September 2013 06:24PM

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Comment author: gjm 15 September 2013 12:32:15AM 5 points [-]

Refusing to assign numerical probabilities because you don't have a rigorous way to derive them is like refusing to choose whether or not to buy things because you don't have a rigorous way to decide how much they're worth to you.

Explicitly assigning a probability isn't always (perhaps isn't usually) worth the trouble it takes, and rushing to assign numerical probabilities can certainly lead you astray -- but that doesn't mean it can't be done or that it shouldn't be done (carefully!) in cases where making a good decision matters most.

When you haven't taken the trouble to decide a numerical probability, then indeed vague expressions are all you've got, but unless you have a big repertoire of carefully graded vague expressions (which would, in fact, not be so very different from assigning probabilities) you'll find that sometimes there are two propositions for both of which you'd say "it could be true, but I doubt it" -- but you definitely find one more credible than the other. If you can make that distinction mentally, why shouldn't you make it verbally?

Comment author: jdgalt 23 November 2013 03:42:17AM *  1 point [-]

If it were a case like you describe (two competing products in a store), I would have to guess, and thus would have to try to think of some "upstream" questions and guess those, too. Not impossible, but unlikely to unearth worthwhile information. For questions as remote as P(aliens), I don't see a reason to bother.

Have you seen David Friedman's discussion of rational voter ignorance in The Machinery of Freedom?