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Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on What makes us think _any_ of our terminal values aren't based on a misunderstanding of reality? - Less Wrong
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I'm trying to think of what kind of zombies there could be besides philosophical ones.
Epistemological zombie: My brain has exactly the same state, all the neurons in all the same places, and likewise the rest of the universe, but my map doesn't possess any 'truth' or 'accuracy'.
Ontological zombie: All the atoms are in all the same places but they don't exist.
Existential zombie: All the atoms are in all the same places but they don't mean anything.
Causal zombie: So far as anyone can tell, my brain is doing exactly the same things, but only by coincidence and not because it follows from the laws of physics.
Mathematical zombie: Just like me only it doesn't run on math.
Logical zombie: I got nothin'.
Conceivability zombie: It's exactly like me but it lacks the property of conceivability.
Löwenheim–Skolem zombie: Makes statements that are word-for-word identical to the ones that you make about uncountable sets, and for the same causal reasons (namely, because you both implement the inference rules of ZF in the same way), but its statements aren't about actually uncountable sets, because it lives in a countable model of ZF.
Your causal zombie reminds me of Leibniz's pre-established harmony.
Oddly enough, the other day I ran into someone who appears to literally believe a combination of these two.