TheOtherDave comments on Fake Causality - Less Wrong
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Sure, but we could imagine an AI deciding something like "I do not want to enjoy frozen yogurt", and then altering its code in such a way that it is no longer appropriate to describe it as enjoying frozen yogurt, yeah?
This seems trivially false - if an AI is instantiated as a bunch of zeros and ones in some substrate, how could Godel or similar concerns stop it from altering any subset of those bits?
You see reasons to believe that any artificial intelligence is limited to altering its motivations and desires in a way that is qualitatively similar to humans? This seems like a pretty extreme claim - what are the salient features of human self-rewriting that you think must be preserved?
I don't think it's a "consensus" so much as an assumed consensus for the sake of argument. Some do believe that any hypothetical AI's influence is practically unlimited, some agree to assume that because it's not ruled out and is a worst-case scenario or an interesting case (see wedrifid's comment on the grandparent (aside: not sure how unusual or nonobvious this is, but we often use familial relationships to describe the relative positions of comments, e.g. the comment I am responding to is the "parent" of this comment, the one you were responding to when you wrote it is the "grandparent". I think that's about as far as most users take the metaphor, though.)).
Thanks for challenging my position. This discussion is very stimulating for me!
I'm actually having trouble imagining this without anthropomorphizing (or at least zoomorphizing) the agent. When is it appropriate to describe an artificial agent as enjoying something? Surely not when it secretes serotonin into its bloodstream and synapses?
It's not a question of stopping it. Gödel is not giving it a stern look, saying: "you can't alter your own code until you've done your homework". It's more that these considerations prevent the agent from being in a state where it will, in fact, alter its own code in certain ways. This claim can and should be proved mathematically, but I don't have the resources to do that at the moment. In the meanwhile, I'd agree if you wanted to disagree.
I believe that this is likely, yes. The "salient feature" is being subject to the laws of nature, which in turn seem to be consistent with particular theories of logic and probability. The problem with such a claim is that these theories are still not fully understood.
When is it appropriate to describe a natural agent as enjoying something?
As I said, when it secretes serotonin into its bloodstream and synapses.
That strikes me as terrible definition of enjoyment - particularly because seratonin release isn't nearly as indicative of enjoyment as popular culture would suggest. Even using dopamine would be better (but still not particularly good).
I wasn't basing it on popular culture, but that doesn't mean I'm not wrong.
Do you have a better suggestion?
If not, I'd ask CuSithBell to please clarify her (or his) ideas without using controversially defined terminology (which was also my sentiment before).
My impression was 'her', not 'his'.
That's a big "ouch" on my part. Sorry. Lesson learned.
You didn't say; rather, you said (well, implied) that it wasn't appropriate to describe an artificial agent as enjoying something in that case. But, OK, you've said now. Thanks for clarifying.