potato comments on Fake Causality - Less Wrong

41 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 August 2007 06:12PM

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Comment author: potato 07 June 2012 03:48:44AM *  0 points [-]

if it [...] has a false conclusion, you should forget about the reasoning altogether

and

some people don't seem to understand contexts in which the truth value of a statement is unimportant.

You see no problem here?

Comment author: royf 07 June 2012 04:09:37AM *  0 points [-]

Not at all. If you insist, let's take it from the top:

  • I wanted to convey my reasoning, let's call it R.

  • I quoted a claim of the form "because P is true, Q is true", where R is essentially "if P then Q". This was a rhetorical device, to help me convey what R is.

  • I indicated clearly that I don't know whether P or Q are true. Later I said that I suspect P is false.

  • Note that my reasoning is, in principle, falsifiable: if P is true and Q is false, then R must be false.

  • While Q may be relatively easy to check, I think P is not.

  • I expect to have other means of proving R.

  • I feel that I'm allowed to focus on conveying R first, and attempting to prove or falsify it at a later date. The need to clarify my ideas helped me understand them better, in preparation of future proof.

  • I stated clearly and repeatedly that I'm just conveying an idea here, not providing evidence for it, and that I agree with readers who choose to doubt it until shown evidence.

Do you still think I'm at fault here?

EDIT: Your main objection to my presentation was that Q could be false. Would you like to revise that objection?

Comment author: potato 07 June 2012 08:13:26PM *  0 points [-]

I don't want to revise my objection, because it's not really a material implication that you're using. You're using probabilistic reasoning in your argument,i.e., pointing out certain pressures that exist, which rule out certain ways that people could be getting smarter, and therefor increases our probability that people are not getting smarter. But if people are in fact getting smarter, this reasoning is either too confident in the pressures, or is using far from bayesian updating.

Either way, I feel like we took up too much space already. If you would like to continue, I would love to do so in a private message.