How can you tell that something "can exist without any ambiguity within it", if it "is undefined, or even cannot be defined"?
And what constitutes being "still a tenable concept"? What exactly are you trying to defend these undefined terms from?
Your examples seem less than convincing.
I have the impression -- perhaps quite wrongly -- that there's some particular example or class of examples that you have in mind but haven't listed here, which provides the actual motivation for this. Certainly the examples you've given don't seem to me like cases where (1) a concept is undefined or even indefinable, (2) it's clear that it "can exist without any ambiguity within it", and (3) there's any call to defend it from charges of untenability (whatever that actually means). Am I wrong?
(It occurs to me that what you've written would be more credible to me -- though I think I'd still disagree -- if by "ambiguity" you meant not "multiple or indefinite meanings" but something more like "internal contradictions". That seems like an odd misconception to have, but such things can happen to the best of people. The only purpose of this paragraph is to give you a chance to notice and clarify in the unlikely even that that's what's going on.)
I'm not sure about this, but presenting it anyway for scrutiny.
I was thinking that it doesn't matter if a concept is undefined, or even cannot be defined, if hypothetically speaking said concept can exist without any ambiguity within it then it is still a tenable concept. The implications, if this is true, would be that it would knock down Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Your thoughts, Lesswrong?