I think he means that if the pebblesorters came along, and studied humanity, they would come up with a narrow cluster which they would label "h-right" instead of their "p-right", and that the cluster h-right is accessible to all scientifically-minded observers. It's objective in the sense that "the number of exterior columns in the design of the Parthenon" is objective, but not in the sense that "15*2+8*2" is objective. The first is 46, but could have been something else in another universe; the second is 46, and can't be something else in another universe.
But... it looks like he's implying that "h-right" is special among "right"s in that it can't be something else in another universe, but that looks wrong for simple reasons. It's also not obvious to me that h-right is a narrow cluster.
Datapoint: I didn't find Metaethics all that confusing, although I am not sure I agree with it.
It looks like he's implying that "h-right" is special among "right"s in that it can't be something else in another universe, but that looks wrong for simple reasons. It's also not obvious to me that h-right is a narrow cluster.
I had this impression too, and have more or less the same sort-of-objection to it. I say "sort of" because I don't find "h-right as a narrow cluster" obvious, but I don't find it obviously wrong ...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: