Long and rambling? Sure. But then so is much else in the sequences, including the quantum mechanics sequence. As for arguing from premises you don't share, what would those premises be? It's a sincere question, and knowing your answer would be helpful for writing my own post(s) on metaethics.
I recall not being able to identify with the premises... some of them were really quite significant.
I now recall, it was with "The Moral Void, in which apparently I had different answers than expected.
"Would you kill babies if it was inherently the right thing to do?"
The post did discuss morality on/off switches later in the context of religion, as an argument against (wishing for / wanting to find) universally compelling arguments.
The post doesn't work for me because it seems there is an argument against the value of universally compellin...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: