It's been a while since I read (part of) the metaethics sequence. With that said:
I have a pretty strong aversion to the word "right" used in discourse. The word is used to mean a few different things, and people often fail to define their use of it sufficiently for me to understand what they're talking about. I don't remember being able to tell whether Eliezer was attempting to make a genuine argument for moral-realism; when he introduced the seemingly sensical term h-right (recognizing that things humans often feel are "right" are simply terminal values humans/that subset of humans) and then seemed to declare h-right->right, I stopped reading shortly thereafter (as I was either totally failing to parse or he was making no sense.)
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: