I am a moral subjectivist and a moral realist. The only point of contention I'd have with EY is if he is a non psycho human moral universalist. I felt that his language was ambiguous on that point, and at times he seemed to be making arguments in that direction. I just couldn't tell.
In other words, we need to know how we ought to resolve moral disagreements,
But if\ we're going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that "we ought" too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
And I don't think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
But if\ we're going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that "we ought" too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
Does the fact that people have different opinions about non moral claims, means there are no objective, scientific facts?
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: