I am a moral subjectivist and a moral realist.
Traditional usage defines those terms to exclude the possibility of being both. The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
So I don't know quite what you mean.
a non psycho human moral universalist.
You mean someone who doesn't believe that there are moral universals among humans? One too many adjectives for me.
And I don't think you get a compelling answer from some smuggled self recursion, but from your best estimate of what people actually are.
If I understand this right: you're contrasting trying to come up with some self-justifying method for resolving disagreement (recursively finding consensus on how to find consensus) with... descriptive moral psychology? I'm not sure I follow.
The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn't if I knew mo...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: