This seems like a straightforward description of ethical subjectivism -- the position that moral sentences are about the attitudes of people (notice that isn't the same as saying they are relative).
Except that's not Eliezer's view. The mistake you're making here is the equivalent of thinking that, because the meaning of the word "water" is determined by how English speakers use it, therefore sentences about water are sentences about the behavior of English speakers.
I understand, this is what I'm dealing with in the second to last paragraph.
...I can see how you can sort of structure the arguments and questions and get it to output "moral realism" if you really had to. You say that the word "right" designates particular facts about worlds such that worlds can be objectively evaluated according to that concept. But to me, it is weird and confusing to ignore the fact that the rule uniting those facts about the world is determined by our attitudes-- especially since we can't right now enumerate the rigi
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: