I never used "realism," so there's no point in my defining it.
Look back at this thread!
My whole point was that Eliezer avoids the word. He thinks that cognitivism is a useful concept, so he uses it. Similarly, he avoids "moral subjectivism" and uses terms like "subjectively objective." He equivocates when asked for a label, endorsing both "realist" and "cognitivist anti-realist." But he does spell out the details, in tens of thousands of words across this sequence.
Yes, if people want to pin down Eliezer's views they should say what parts are realist and what parts are anti-realist. When I object to people calling him realist or anti-realist, I'm certainly agreeing with that!
After that comment about "bashing philosophy," I don't think there's any point in responding to your first paragraph.
But he does spell out the details, in tens of thousands of words across this sequence.
I am one of a number of people who cannot detect a single coherent theory in his writings. A summary in the standard jargon would be helpful in persuading me that there is one.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: