I understand, this is what I'm dealing with in the second to last paragraph.
I can see how you can sort of structure the arguments and questions and get it to output "moral realism" if you really had to. You say that the word "right" designates particular facts about worlds such that worlds can be objectively evaluated according to that concept. But to me, it is weird and confusing to ignore the fact that the rule uniting those facts about the world is determined by our attitudes-- especially since we can't right now enumerate the rigid contents of our moral language and have to apply the rule in most circumstances.
There is a sense in which all concepts both exist subjectively and objectively. There is some mathematical function that describes all the things that ChrisHallquist thinks are funny just like there is a mathematical function that describes the behavior of atoms. We can get into the nitty-gritty about what makes a concept subjective and what makes a concept objective. But I don't see what the case for morality counting as "objective" is unless we're just going to count all concepts as objective.
Can you be clearer about the way you are using "describes" here?
I'm not clear if you are thinking about a) a giant lookup table of all the things Chris Hallquist finds funny, or b) a program that is more compact than that list - so compact, indeed, that a cut-down bug-filled beta of it can be implemented inside his skull! - but yet can generate the list.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: