I happen to (mostly) agree that there aren't universally compelling arguments, but I still wish there were. The metaethics sequence failed to talk me out of valuing this.
But you realize that Eliezer is arguing that there aren't universally compelling arguments in any domain, including mathematics or science? So if that doesn't threaten the objectivity of mathematics or science, why should that threaten the objectivity of morality?
For whatever reason, I feel like my morality changes under counterfactuals.
Can you elaborate?
Waah? Of course there are universally compelling arguments in math and science. (Can you elaborate?)
For whatever reason, I feel like my morality changes under counterfactuals.
Can you elaborate?
It is easy for me to think of scenarios where any particular behavior might be moral. So that if someone asks me, "imagine that it is the inherently right thing to kill babies, " it seems rather immediate to answer that in that case, killing babies would be inherently right.
This is also part of the second problem, where there aren't so many things I ...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: