For my own part, I'm perfectly content to say that we care about what we (currently) care about because we care about it, so all of this "moral miracle" stuff about how what we (currently) care about really is special seems unnecessary.
It is equally correct to say we believe what we believe, that doesn't make our beliefs true.
Yes: valuing something implies that I value it, and believing something doesn't imply that it's true. Agreed.
I assume you're trying to imply that there exists some X that bears the same kind of relationship to valuing that truth has to belief, and that I'm making an analogous error by ignoring X and just talking about value as if I ignored truth and just talked about belief.
Then again, maybe not. You seem fond of making these sorts of gnomic statements and leaving it to others to unpack your meaning. I'm not really sure why.
Anyway, if that is your poin...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: