although humans are free-willed, some actions do or do not contribute to achieving a human's natural purpose in life. Said purpose is meant to be coherent, unlike evolutionary purpose- so better achievement would lead to achieving satisfaction in the long run
If I understand you correctly, your claim that if this turns out to be true, then I ought to perform those acts which contribute to achieving my natural purpose, whether I net-value satisfaction or not. Yes?
When there is a conflict between two desires both which feel like they have some claim to moral rightness, correct metaethics is essential to sort out what best to do.
Is it? It seems like object-level ethics achieves this purpose perfectly well. If it returns the result that they are equally good to do, then the correct thing to do is pick one. What do I need metaethics for, here?
The probability of that theory in reality is very, very low- it is a hypothetical universe. However, given that human beings have a tendency to define ethics in an Objective light in such a universe it would make sense to call it "objective ethics". Admittedly I assume you value satisfaction here, but my argument is about what to call moral behaviour more than what you 'should' do.
Assuming Eliezer's metaethics is actually true, you have a very good point. Eliezer, however, might argue that it is necessary to avoid becoming a 'morality pump'- doin...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: