Since Eliezer-Good is roughly synonymous to CEV, maybe we can just call it CEV from now on?
This leaves out the "rigid designator" bit that people are discussing up-thread. Your formulation invites the response, "So, if our CEV were different, then different things would be good?" Eliezer wants the answer to this to be "No."
Perhaps we can say that "Eliezer-Good" is roughly synonymous to "Our CEV as it actually is in this, the actual, world as this world is right now."
Thus, if our CEV were different, we would be in a different possible world, and so our CEV in that world would not determine what is good. Even in that different, non-actual, possible world, what is good would be determined by what our actual CEV says is good in this, the actual, world.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: