That's an open-ended question which I don't have many existing public resources to address - but thanks for your interest. Very briefly:
I like evolution, Yukdowsky seems to dislike it. Ethically, Yukdowsky is an intellectual descendant of Huxley, while I see myself as thinking more along the lines of Kropotkin.
Yukdowsky seems to like evolutionary psychology. So far evolutionary psychology has only really looked at human universals. To take understanding of the mind further, it is necessary to move to a framework of gene-meme coevolution. Evolutionary psychology is politically correct - through not examining huamn differences - but is scientifically very limited in what it can say, because of the significance of cultural transmission on human behaviour.
Yudkowsky likes utilitarianism. I view utilitarianism largely as a pretty unrealistic ethical philosophy adopted by ethical philosophers for signalling reasons.
Yukdowsky is an ethical philosopher - and seems to be on a mission to persuade people that giving control a machine that aggregates their preferences will be OK. I don't have a similar axe to grind.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: