But if\ we're going to be moral subjectivists, we should realize that "we ought" too easily glosses over the fact that ought_you is not identical to ought_me.
Does the fact that people have different opinions about non moral claims, means there are no objective, scientific facts?
It doesn't mean that, no.
But it does mean that I ought not behave as though objective, scientific facts exist until I have some grounds for doing so, and that "some people think their intuitions reflect objective, scientific facts" doesn't qualify as a ground for doing so.
At this point, one could ask "well, OK, what qualifies as a ground for behaving as though objective, scientific facts exist?" and the conversation can progress in a vaguely sensible direction.
I would similarly ask (popping your metaphorical stack) "what qualifies...
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: