I assume you're trying to imply that there exists some X that bears the same kind of relationship to valuing that truth has to belief, and that I'm making an analogous error by ignoring X and just talking about value as if I ignored truth and just talked about belief.
I think that is a distinct possibility.
Do you believe such a thing is important?
What's more important? What would serve as a good excuse for doing immoral things, or not knowing right from wrong?
What would serve as a good excuse for doing immoral things, or not knowing right from wrong?
The lack of anything depending on whether an act was immoral; the lack of any consequences to not knowing right from wrong.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: