The standard definition of a moral realist is someone who believes that moral judgments express mind-independent facts; while the standard definition of a moral subjectivist is someone who believes moral judgments express mind-dependent facts.
My point being that the categories themselves are not used consistently, so that I can be called either one or the other depending on usage.
Definitions tend to be theory bound themselves, so that mind dependent and mind independent are not clear cut. If I think that eating cows is fine, but I wouldn't if I knew more and thought longer, which represents my mind - both, neither, the first, the second?
For example, if you go to the article in La Wik on Ethical Subjectvism, they talk about "opinions" and not minds. In this case, my opinion would be that eating cows is fine, but it would not be my extrapolated values.
Some would call my position realism, and some would call it subjectivism. Me, I don't care what you call it. I recognize that my position could be called either within the bounds of normal usage.
non psycho human moral universalist.
Someone who believes that what is moral is universal across humans who are not psychos.
If I understand this right
I think you're getting the point there.
There seems to be a widespread impression that the metaethics sequence was not very successful as an explanation of Eliezer Yudkowsky's views. It even says so on the wiki. And frankly, I'm puzzled by this... hence the "apparently" in this post's title. When I read the metaethics sequence, it seemed to make perfect sense to me. I can think of a couple things that may have made me different from the average OB/LW reader in this regard: