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Ishaan comments on Rationality Quotes November 2013 - Less Wrong
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Then you're defining it differently from the way I, and others, are.
My req's for a Newcomblike problem:
1) Individuals who make certain decisions seem to win at higher rates than individuals who do not.
2) As far as you know, the act of decision doesn't causally effect the likelihood of a win.
what where your reqs?
These two requirements seem inconsistent.
I'd define a decision problem to be Newcomb-like if the payoff and the agent mental state (preferences, beliefs, decision procedures) are not independend conditional on the agent's decision.
Some of the problem on the list you linked are Newcomb-like, other are committment problems, other aren't even decision problems.
My def. isn't inconsistent. Those who buy computers are less likely to die of malaria,
^that's an instance of Solomon's problem, which is considered a newcomblike problem.
It's the same as the fact that those who one-box are more likely to get more money in Newcomb's. A third factor (socioeconomic status, CTGA allele, agent's mental state prior to decision) accounts for the variance.
Once you condition on all the available evidence, such as the socioeconomic status, these two events become independent.
Likewise, in the Solomon's problem, a genetic test that detects the lesion would destroy the Newcomb-like structure of the dilemma.