1) Individuals who make certain decisions seem to win at higher rates than individuals who do not. 2) As far as you know, the act of decision doesn't causally effect the likelihood of a win.
These two requirements seem inconsistent.
I'd define a decision problem to be Newcomb-like if the payoff and the agent mental state (preferences, beliefs, decision procedures) are not independend conditional on the agent's decision.
Some of the problem on the list you linked are Newcomb-like, other are committment problems, other aren't even decision problems.
My def. isn't inconsistent. Those who buy computers are less likely to die of malaria,
^that's an instance of Solomon's problem, which is considered a newcomblike problem.
It's the same as the fact that those who one-box are more likely to get more money in Newcomb's. A third factor (socioeconomic status, CTGA allele, agent's mental state prior to decision) accounts for the variance.
Another month has passed and here is a new rationality quotes thread. The usual rules are: