Thanks to the original poster for the post, and the clarification about universal compelling arguments.

I agree with the parent comment, however, that I never matched the meaning that Chris Hallquist used to the phrase 'universally compelling argument'. Within the phrase 'universally compelling argument', I think most people package:

1. the claim has objective truth value, and
2. there is some epistemiologically justified way of knowing the claim

Thus I think this means only a "logical" (rational) mind needs convincing - - one that would update on sound epistemology.

I would guess most people have a definition like this in mind. But these are just definitions, and now I know what you meant by math and science don't have universally compelling arguments. And I agree, using your definition.

Would you make the stronger argument that math and science aren't based on sound epistemology? (Or that there is no such thing as epistemiologically justified ways of knowing?)